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Introduction
Regulation is nearly as old as law itself. Like law in general, regulation consists of rules backed 
up	with	consequences,	but	it	is	law	specifically	aimed	at	preventing	misconduct	by	businesses	
and other organizations, and enforced primarily by specialized government agencies. Although 
governments have regulated economic activity since ancient times, the regulatory state grew 
enormously in most economically advanced democracies in the twentieth century, spurred 
by rapid technological and economic change and political demands for protection against 
monopolistic power and the risks of industrial activity.
Over the past 50 years, regulatory agencies and the rules they promulgate have become 
prominent components of contemporary legal systems, often eclipsing legislative and judicial 
rules in their economic and social effects. In most countries, regulatory inspectors now 
constitute a vast white-collar police force, enforcing regulations that address risks from nearly 
every	facet	of	economic	activity,	including	rules	on	workplace	safety,	financial	security,	air	
and	water	pollution,	fire	and	accident	prevention,	earthquake	protection,	health	and	elder	care	
delivery,	food	and	drug	quality,	and	proper	maintenance	of	airplanes,	elevators,	school	buses	
and railroad tracks.
Appropriately, sociolegal scholars have increasingly turned their attention to regulatory 
processes in an attempt to discern how regulations actually operate and what impact they 
have on business and society. The study of regulation by sociologists, political scientists, 
economists, and others has tended to focus on four main areas. First, social scientists have 
sought to understand and explain the process by which regulations are created, scrutinizing 
the political and institutional variables affecting policymaking decisions within regulatory 
agencies. Second, researchers have studied the behaviour of government inspectors and 
the processes of regulatory enforcement. Third, social scientists have studied the effects of 
regulations and their enforcement on business behaviour – both the positive and negative, 
intended and unintended responses. Finally, researchers have theorized about and, increasingly, 
have empirically analysed new models of regulation, such as market-based, performance-
based, and management-based regulation.
The essays in this volume have been selected to showcase the key issues addressed within the 
scholarly literature in each of these four areas, as well as to convey the research methods they 
have	employed	and	the	findings	and	generalizations	they	have	produced.	In	this	Introduction,	
we	highlight	the	major	themes	and	findings	from	the	broader	research	literature	represented	
by the work reprinted in this volume.
Regulatory Policy Making
Even	as	it	has	become	widely	accepted	that	it	is	socially	beneficial	to	allow	private	businesses	
to make their own economic decisions in light of competitive and customer pressures, it is 
also widely accepted that certain types of business behaviour can be detrimental to society. 
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Government intervention is needed when high transaction costs prevent markets from adhering 
to the underlying assumptions of perfect competition (Coase, 1960; Zerbe and McCurdy, 
1999).	Society	needs	regulation	specifically	to	correct	for	failures	of	the	private	marketplace,	
such as the accumulation of market power in the form of monopolies, the lack of information 
needed	by	market	actors	to	make	fully	informed	decisions,	and	the	frequent	negative	side-
effects or externalities of business activity (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1980; Breyer, 1982; 
Sunstein, 1990; Viscusi et al., 2000).
Although the standard theory of market failure provides a well-accepted normative 
justification	for	regulation,	 it	only	goes	so	far	 in	providing	a	positive	or	empirical	account	
of how and why regulations get made. Social scientists have shown that policy making and 
implementation generally fails to follow a rational order that accords with how we might think 
policy should be made and implemented (Lindblom, 1959; Kingdon, 1984; Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984).  The same can be said of regulatory policymaking. Despite the occasional 
exception (Levine and Forrence, 1990), for at least the last half-century scholars have argued 
that regulatory policymaking often departs from the normative logic of market failure and 
instead	reflects	the	push	and	pull	of	interest	group	politics	(Wilson,	1980,	1989).
Perhaps the clearest example of this kind of departure arises when regulatory authorities 
have been captured by the industries they are supposed to regulate, serving business interests 
rather than the overall interests of society (Huntington, 1952; Bernstein, 1955; Lowi, 1969). 
Some scholars have argued that regulatory programs respond to organized business interests 
by using the coercive power of government to impose barriers to entry on low-cost or foreign 
competitors (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman 1976). Examples of regulatory regimes that serve as 
barriers to entry, or otherwise advance the interests of regulated industry, include professional 
licensing,	certain	ratemaking	regulatory	regimes,	and	regulations	that	privilege	existing	firms	
over newer ones (Kolko, 1965; Ackerman and Hassler, 1981; Abbott, 1988; Stavins, 2006).
Furthermore, governments do not automatically enact new regulations in response to public 
problems,	 such	as	oil	 spills,	 industrial	 accidents,	or	financial	 scandals	 (Kingdon,	1984).	A	
problem may be a necessary condition for the enactment of new regulation, but its existence 
is	by	no	means	sufficient	to	explain	the	adoption	of	new	rules	(Elliott	et al., 1985). When the 
benefits	of	new	regulations	are	spread	out	over	thousands	or	millions	of	individuals,	affected	
individuals face challenges in organizing to advance their interests (Olson, 1968). Since the 
costs of new regulatory programs are usually concentrated on a relatively small number of 
business enterprises that can bring political pressure to bear to thwart or modify regulatory 
proposals,	 industry’s	 interests	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 better	 reflected	 in	 regulatory	 policy	 at	 the	
margin	than	are	the	greater	aggregate	interests	of	diffuse	and	unorganized	social	beneficiaries	
of regulation (Wilson, 1980).
Not all regulatory developments, though, can be explained as advancing the interests 
of regulated industry (Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001). The movement to deregulate major 
industries	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	clearly	draws	regulatory	capture	into	question,	for	this	never	
would	have	occurred	if	legacy	firms	possessed	an	iron	grip	on	the	policy	process	and	used	
regulation to restrict entry to competitors (Derthick and Quirk, 1985). Similarly, the great 
expanse of consumer protection, environmental, worker safety and civil rights regulation 
enacted in the latter part of the twentieth century belies any simplistic belief in unwavering 
industry power (Kamieniecki, 2006).  Much regulation today imposes extensive costs on 
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industry,	often	precisely	 to	deliver	broad	and	diffuse	benefits	 to	 individuals	across	 society	
(Vogel, 1989).
In the last half century, policy entrepreneurs have prodded governments around the world 
to enact scores of regulatory laws that do not appear to be primarily driven by industry’s 
rent-seeking behaviour.  Even if rent-seeking remains an important aspect of regulatory 
politics, the degree to which the rent-seekers succeed clearly varies.  The explosive growth 
of regulation has been the product of intensifying political demands for regulation together 
with governmental responsiveness to those demands (Kagan, 1994; Braithwaite and Drahos, 
2000). On the demand side, powerful political movements, such as the labour, environmental, 
and civil rights movements, have certainly been instrumental in the growth of regulation 
(McCann,	1986;	Coglianese,	2001).	 In	addition,	better-educated	and	more	affluent	publics	
have	simply	become	increasingly	intolerant	of	risks	and	injustices	that	less	affluent	publics	
tend more readily to accept (Friedman, 1985; Inglehart, 1997).
On the responsiveness side, the increasing competitiveness of electoral democracy may 
result in a more ready supply of policy proposals from political candidates and parties eager to 
satisfy voters’ desire for greater protection from harm, mistreatment and economic insecurity 
(Bardach and Kagan, 1982). Even competition across regulatory jurisdictions, which might 
be expected to lead jurisdictions consistently to race to the bottom in terms of regulatory 
stringency, has been found sometimes to prompt nations with less stringent regulations to 
emulate the laws of nations with tougher regulations (Revesz, 1992; Vogel, 1995; Vogel and 
Kagan, 2004). The ease of exchanging information in an increasingly global economy, as well 
as	the	trend	towards	greater	integration	of	the	world’s	economic	and	financial	systems,	also	
contributes to tendencies towards diffusion and convergence of regulatory policies (Shapiro, 
1993; Lazer, 2005; but see Haines, 2005).
The ascendancy of the regulatory state over the past half-century has led social scientists 
to investigate how governments make regulatory policy. In doing so, they have explored 
both	 political	 and	 institutional	 factors	 that	 affect	 the	 decisions	 of	 regulatory	 officials.	 For	
example, in advanced economies like that of the United States, responsibility for regulatory 
policy	making	often	rests	with	the	bureaucracy,	within	which	unelected	officials	in	hundreds	
of regulatory agencies make key decisions affecting business and society. The delegation of 
authority to the bureaucracy creates a well-known principal-agent problem because agencies 
may	generate	policies	that	differ	from	the	preferences	of	the	elected	officials	that	established	
them (Niskanen, 1971). As a legal matter, of course, bureaucratic agencies do make 
regulatory policy under the authority of legislation, which has sometimes been said to serve 
as a ‘transmission belt’ connecting bureaucracies to the legislature (Stewart, 1975). However, 
as	an	empirical	matter,	 the	concept	of	a	 legislative	‘transmission	belt’	does	not	adequately	
explain agency policymaking. Regulatory agencies do still retain considerable discretion and 
autonomy (Eisner and Meier, 1990; Spence, 1997), if for no other reason than that statutory 
language is itself often vague and gives agencies a considerable degree of discretion (Lowi, 
1969).
Scholars have focused much attention on efforts by the electoral branches of government 
in	the	United	States	to	influence,	if	not	control,	bureaucratic	behaviour.	Two	major	schools	
of thought have developed, one that emphasizes ‘presidential dominance’, the other 
‘congressional dominance’. Presidents can seek to control agency policymaking by appointing 
the heads of the agencies and approving the submission of agency budgets to Congress (Moe, 
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1987; E. Kagan, 2001). Congress can call hearings and conduct investigations, but still more 
significantly	the	legislature	can	use	appropriations	to	reward	or	punish	agencies	(McCubbins	
and Schwartz, 1984; Weingast, 1984). Over the years, researchers in the United States have 
found	evidence	that	both	presidents	and	Congress	do	influence	the	work	of	regulatory	agencies	
(for example, Moe, 1982; Weingast and Moran, 1983; Wood, 1988; Wood and Waterman, 
1991;	Ringquist,	1995),	 although	most	of	 these	 studies	 focus	on	agencies’	 adjudication	or	
enforcement decisions rather than on decisions about making new policies (Spence, 1997).
The essay by Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast  reprinted as 
Chapter 1 in this volume, turns attention to what has become known as the procedural control 
of agency policy making. McCubbins, Noll and Weingast theorize that Congress designs 
administrative procedures pre-emptively in an attempt to solve the principal-agent problem. 
Although	the	field	of	administrative	law	has	long	acknowledged	the	importance	of	regulatory	
procedures (for example, Breyer, 1982; Strauss, 1992), social scientists have more recently 
adopted a ‘new institutionalist’ orientation according to which they view policymaking and 
organizational structures as important variables in explaining policy outcomes (Moe, 1990). 
McCubbins,	Noll	and	Weingast’s	contribution	has	been	to	show	how	the	transparency	required	
by congressionally imposed procedures helps political principals in the legislature keep tabs 
on	regulatory	agencies.	They	argue	that	the	requirements	for	public	comment	mandated	by	the	
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 help ensure ongoing participation by the same interest 
group	 coalition	 that	 supported	Congress’s	 legislative	 delegation	 to	 the	 agency	 in	 the	 first	
place. In this way, administrative procedure allows the coalition in the legislature to rely on 
interest groups as monitors and proxies, thereby overcoming the legislature’s informational 
disadvantage and helping to ‘stack the deck’ in administrative proceedings in favour of the 
preferences of the winning legislative coalition (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, Chapter 1, 
and 1989).
The	 path	 charted	 by	McCubbins’,	Noll’s	 and	Weingast	 has	 been	 influential,	with	 other	
scholars seeking to model the effects of administrative procedure on regulatory decision-
making (Bawn, 1995; de Figueiredo et al., 1999; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). Efforts to 
test empirically the procedural control thesis have found some support in that procedural 
requirements	for	specified	 types	of	policy	analysis	may	 tilt	 the	policy	balance	 towards	 the	
values advanced by the analysis (Potoski and Woods, 2001). However, researchers have so 
far found relatively little support for the prediction that procedures ‘stack the deck’ in favour 
of	the	beneficiaries	of	new	regulation	(Balla,	1998;	Spence,	1999;	Potoski	and	Woods,	2001).	
For example, in a study of the implementation of legislation designed to increase Medicare 
reimbursement fees for primary care physicians, Balla (1998) found that the health care 
financing	administration	was	more	responsive	in	its	rule-making	to	comments	submitted	by	
medical specialists than to those submitted by primary care doctors, the legislature’s intended 
beneficiaries.
Even if rule-making procedures for public participation do not always ‘stack the deck’, this 
does not mean that these or other procedures make no difference whatsoever. An abundant 
research literature, both from the domain of administrative law and new institutionalism, 
continues to examine the importance of regulatory procedure and oversight mechanisms 
(Morgan, 1999; Kerwin, 2003). Increasingly, scholars have attempted to scrutinize empirically 
the	 effects	 of	 administrative	 procedures,	 asking	 whether	 specific	 procedures	 improve	 the	
regulatory process in the manner intended by institutional designers. As reviewed by Coglianese 
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(2002), the emerging literature that evaluates administrative procedures include studies of 
mandates for economic analysis of new rules (for example, Hahn, 1996; Morgenstern, 1997; 
Croley, 2003), opportunities for judicial oversight (for example, Mashaw, 1994; Schuck and 
Elliott, 1990), and experiments with consensus-based decision-making such as negotiated 
rule-making (for example, Harrington, 1994; Coglianese, 1997; Balla and Wright, 2003).
Of course, regulatory procedures may also sometimes have unintended or undesirable 
effects. Procedures that provide for oversight, for example, may contribute to an unwanted 
‘ossification’	of	the	regulatory	process	(Mendeloff,	1988;	McGarity,	1992).	Whether	oversight	
is	performed	by	the	courts	or	by	a	centralized	review	body	such	as	the	Office	of	Management	
and	 Budget,	 it	 adds	 another	 procedural	 layer	 and	 may	 prompt	 regulatory	 officials	 to	 act	
defensively, taking more time to build a case that will withstand the review process (R.A. 
Kagan,  2001). Facing additional burdens imposed by review procedures, some agencies 
have allegedly retreated from rule-making altogether (Mashaw and Harfst, 1991) or found 
alternative ways accomplishing regulatory goals without developing new rules (Hamilton and 
Schroeder, 1994).
Stuart Shapiro, in an essay reprinted here as Chapter 2, set out to test the extent to which 
regulatory procedures impede regulators from adopting regulations. To determine whether 
procedural	 stringency	 affects	 either	 substantive	 stringency	 or	 the	 frequency	 of	 regulatory	
change, Shapiro examined a carefully matched set of eight state systems of day care regulation 
– a regulatory domain largely unaffected by federal control. Exploiting the natural experiment 
made possible by a comparison of states with intricate rule-making procedures with otherwise 
similar states that have more streamlined procedures (Teske, 1994), Shapiro found no 
systematic difference in the pace or stringency of regulation across the two groups. What he 
did	find,	though,	was	that	the	key	factor	affecting	regulatory	policy	was	the	overall	political	
climate within the state, such as whether the legislature or governorship was controlled by 
Democrats versus Republicans.
Studying regulatory outcomes cross-nationally, other social scientists have similarly 
considered the extent to which policy structures or styles affect regulatory policy outcomes, 
especially compared with the effect of political factors, such as interests, ideologies and 
party control. National governments vary considerably in the way they incorporate affected 
interests into policy decision-making. As Robert A. Kagan (2001) and others have observed, 
the United States exhibits a more pluralistic policy structure than found in other countries, with 
competing	interest	groups	vying	for	influence	in	an	open	and	adversarial	process	(Lundqvist,	
1980; Kelman, 1981; Badaracco, 1985; Brickman et al., 1985; Rose-Ackerman, 1995). In 
contrast with American pluralism, corporatist policymaking in European countries, especially 
in Scandinavia, has often taken the form of formal and structured collaboration between peak 
industry associations, labour and government (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979; Williamson, 
1989).
Do these differences in policy structures lead to differences in regulatory outcomes? This 
question	has	been	most	widely	studied	in	the	context	of	environmental	regulation	(Crepaz,	
1995; Jahn, 1998; Scruggs, this volume, Chapter 3, 2001; Neumayer, 2003). Lyle A. Scruggs, 
in an essay reprinted here as Chapter 3, found that OECD nations that have employed 
such ‘corporatist’ regulatory structures tended to achieve larger relative environmental 
improvements in the 1980s and 1990s, based on an index of several indicators. Scruggs 
failed to observe any explanatory power from electoral variables or political party control. 
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In	contrast,	a	subsequent	analysis	of	a	similar	group	of	countries	by	Neumayer	(2003)	found	
the opposite: namely that corporatist structures do not explain variation in air pollution levels 
across countries, but that lower pollution levels are associated with the strength of green and 
left-libertarian political parties.
Whatever effect corporatist policy structures have on environmental and other types of 
regulatory policy, these policy structures themselves can change over time. Some have 
suggested that the corporatist structures in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, for example, have 
begun	to	become	more	conflict-ridden	and	pluralistic	(Christiansen	and	Rommetvedt,	1999).	
Furthermore, policies and policy outcomes themselves can change, even if basic differences 
in policy structures remain. In Chapter 4, David Vogel argues that the substantive differences 
between European and American environmental regulation have started to disappear over 
the past 15 years, as European regulatory policy has grown increasingly precautionary in 
its	approach	to	risk.	A	subsequent	analysis	of	a	random	sample	of	risks	by	Hammitt	et al. 
(2005)	confirms	a	slight	degree	of	movement	towards	greater	precaution	in	Europe;	however,	
Hammitt et al. (2005) also show that the treatment of risk is highly diverse in both jurisdictions 
– with the US still more precautionary than Europe in its policies about some risks, but with 
Europe more precautionary for others.
Regulatory Enforcement
The ultimate impact of any regulatory policy depends not only on how that policy has been 
drafted	and	designed,	but	also	on	how	enforcement	officials	take	actions	to	implement	those	
policies at the ‘street-level’ (Lipsky, 1980; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). The style and 
strategy of regulatory enforcement has attracted considerable attention from social scientists 
seeking to explain the behaviour of regulatory enforcement personnel.
Two contrasting models shape discussion of the enforcement or implementation of 
regulation (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Hawkins, 1984; Reiss, 1984). One model treats 
regulatory enforcement mainly as a legal process and, according to it, regulations are viewed 
as authoritative legal norms whose violation demands punishment. The other model treats 
enforcement more as a social process, one aimed at stimulating cooperative government-
business problem-solving and which calls for remedial responses to violations. In countries 
throughout the world, some advocacy groups and politicians insist that governments should 
zealously	pursue	a	legalistic	approach,	while	business	groups	and	many	regulatory	officials	
insist that a more cooperative approach is more desirable and effective overall.
The	 legalistic	model	 reflects	 the	 historical	 weight	 of	 criminal	 law	 in	 shaping	 society’s	
response to deviant behaviour, even though the task of enforcing regulatory statutes is usually 
given to specialized administrative agencies rather than to traditional criminal law enforcement 
bodies. That is because regulatory programs are designed primarily to prevent rather than to 
punish harm, and prevention often demands specialized technical knowledge. Also, unlike 
most criminal laws, regulations tend not to seek to prohibit all harmful outcomes (say, pollution 
or worker risks) but only harm that rises above levels that are demonstrably and unacceptably 
high. In other words, regulations do not usually seek to eliminate all sources of pollution or 
all dangers in a workplace, but only ‘unreasonable’ pollution or hazards. Determining exactly 
which behaviours are likely to result in unreasonable hazards, or precisely what should be 
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done	to	prevent	them,	can	require	case-by-case	administrative	judgments	based	on	particular	
technical factors.
Philip Selznick (1969, pp. 14–16) once wrote that the primary purpose of administration 
is not to determine ‘the legal coordinates of a situation’ in light of pre-established legal rules, 
but rather ‘to get the work of society done’, to refashion ‘human or other resources so that a 
particular outcome will be achieved’. Effective regulatory enforcement, in this perspective, 
requires	 dialogue	 between	 regulators	 and	 officials	 in	 each	 regulatory	 facility.	 It	 requires	
whatever blend of rules and exhortation, threat and education, toughness and compromise 
will best induce particular regulated enterprises to cooperate. Even offering rewards may be 
effective at securing compliance (Grabosky, 1995; Braithwaite, 2002b). According to this 
view,	in	order	to	induce	change	in	businesses’	behaviour,	regulatory	officials	must	be	granted	
considerable discretion in implementing general regulatory standards.
On the other hand, some regulatory violations – such as intentional fraud, lying to law 
enforcement	 and	 other	 governmental	 officials,	 and	 reckless	 disregard	 for	 the	 health	 and	
safety of others – are clearly criminal in nature. There are also always a considerable number 
of regulated entities, or harried sub-unit supervisors, who are inclined to cut corners on 
compliance to save time and money. Thus, in the hands of gullible, overly-busy, or politically-
influenced	regulatory	officials,	a	regulatory	agency	too	wedded	to	a	cooperative	enforcement	
style can degenerate into dangerous laxity (Gunningham, 1987) or unfairness (Yeung, 2004), 
or can overlook the root causes of regulatory problems in their zeal to mediate disputes in 
a	way	that	satisfies	all	the	affected	parties	(Silbey,	1984).	Regulatory	advocacy	groups	and	
many	enforcement	officials	therefore	argue	that,	in	order	to	deter	opportunism	or	heedlessness	
on	 the	part	of	 regulated	businesses,	 regulatory	field	offices	 should	have	 little	discretion	 to	
use	their	own,	potentially	corruptible	judgment.	Effective	regulation,	on	this	view,	requires	
specific	legal	rules,	strictly	enforced.
Both	legalistic	and	cooperative	enforcement	styles	are	reflected	in	actual	regulatory	practice.	
As Peter J. May and Søren Winter make clear in their essay reprinted here as Chapter 6, 
regulatory practices are arrayed between the poles of legalistic enforcement and discretionary 
judgement,	between	inspectors	who	are	quick	to	use	the	threat	of	legal	sanctions	and	those	
who are more inclined to emphasize education and persuasion. Much sociolegal research on 
regulatory	 enforcement	 seeks	 to	understand	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	of	 this	 variation	
between these two major enforcement styles, as well as to understand how these styles may 
interact with, or even complement, each other.
Although some agencies continue to approach enforcement legalistically, sociolegal 
research	 finds	 that	 criminal	 prosecution	 of	 regulatory	 violations	 is	 relatively	 infrequent	
(Hawkins,	1984;	Spence,	2001).	Many	regulatory	violations	involve	failure	to	file	timely	and	
fully accurate reports, or failure to take certain precautionary measures, and hence, unlike 
most traditional crimes, do not result in any immediate, tangible harm to others. Moreover, 
due to the complexity of regulatory rule-systems, many violations stem not from wilful 
disregard	 or	 reckless	 behaviour,	 but	 from	 ignorance	 of	 a	 particular	 requirement	 or	 from	
disregard of company compliance policy by lower-level employees (Kagan and Scholz, 1984; 
Vandenbergh, 2003). In both kinds of case, plus others in which violations do not lead to 
significant	harms,	prosecutors	and	judges	are	often	reluctant	to	subject	a	businessperson	or	
firm	to	the	moral	obloquy	and	harsh	sanctions	of	the	criminal	law	(Hawkins,	2002).	Moreover,	
in practical terms, criminal prosecution, with its high burden of proof, can tie up agency 
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officials	in	extended,	labour-intensive	investigations	and	court	hearings,	while	risking	a	legal	
defeat (Coffee, 1981, pp. 400–407; Hawkins, 1989).
Consequently,	many	regulatory	agencies	claim	that	they	strive	for	a	flexible	enforcement	
style: legalistic and punitive when needed, but accommodative and helpful in others, depending 
on the reliability of the regulated enterprise and the seriousness of the risks or harms created 
by particular violations (Hawkins, 1984; May and Winter, Chapter 6). Academic analyses 
generally support this approach. In his essay reprinted as Chapter 5 in this volume, John T. 
Scholz  models the regulatory enforcement as an iterative prisoner’s dilemma. If the regulator 
seeks punitive legal sanctions for every detected violation, the regulated company might be 
expected to mount as strong a legal defence as possible – frustrating the goal of immediate 
reduction of the risks that the rules were designed to minimize. On the other hand, if the 
regulator	withholds	prosecution	in	return	for	the	regulated	firm’s	promise	to	cure	the	violation	
promptly,	the	firm	might	just	keep	stalling,	especially	since	the	legal	threat	has	diminished.	
With these tradeoffs confronting regulators, Scholz concludes that the best outcome for 
society, over time, will result from a dynamic enforcement strategy, according to which 
regulators withhold penal action and even agree to accept ‘substantial compliance’ rather than 
demand	literal	compliance	with	all	legal	rules	–	as	long	as	the	regulated	firm	provides	credible	
commitments	to	remedy	the	most	serious	violations	quickly.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	
regulator must develop a reputation for imposing prompt and costly legal sanctions whenever 
the regulated entity prevaricates or delays. Scholz labels this the ‘tit for tat’ enforcement 
strategy since the regulator meets a regulated entity’s non-cooperation with punishment, while 
responding with forbearance to cooperation, accepting something short of full compliance in 
some cases (see also Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Hawkins, 1984).
John Braithwaite, drawing on extensive empirical research on regulation, agrees that 
cooperation is cheaper and better than punishment, as long as the threat of punishment lies 
behind the invitation to cooperate (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2002a). Yet 
he also emphasizes that, in order to make that threat credible, regulators must have at their 
disposal	legal	sanctions	that	are	less	severe,	quicker	and	cheaper	than	criminal	prosecution,	
and hence more likely to be used. The most effective regulators can plausibly threaten to meet 
a regulated enterprise’s non-cooperation by successively moving up a ‘pyramid of sanctions’ 
– beginning with a legal citation or warning letter (the most common action, at the bottom 
of	the	pyramid),	then,	if	non-cooperation	persists,	escalating	first	to	intensified	surveillance,	
then	administratively-imposed	fines,	then	larger	court-imposed	civil	penalties	–	and	as	a	last	
resort (or in the very worst cases) to  criminal penalties or delicensure. When an agency 
possesses and is not afraid to use the full range of responses, Braithwaite observes, regulatory 
enforcement can expeditiously and effectively proceed at the lower layers of the pyramid.
A	significant	body	of	empirical	research	has	analysed	why some regulatory agencies and 
individual regulators turn to legalistic enforcement more often than others. Cross-nationally, 
regulatory agencies in the United States have often been found to employ a more legalistic 
enforcement style (and impose harsher legal sanctions) than their counterparts in other 
economically advanced democracies (Kelman, 1981; Braithwaite, 1985; Vogel, 1986; Verweij, 
2000). This pattern is illustrated in Kagan and Axelrad (2000) which provides a series of 
cross-national	studies	of	multinational	corporations’	engagement	with	regulatory	officials	and	
shows that American regulators tend to be more rule-bound and punitive.
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The American tendency towards more legalistic enforcement has been attributed to its 
political culture, which is particularly mistrustful of both governmental and corporate power 
(Vogel, 1986; R.A. Kagan, 2001). In the United States, both the political left and the political 
right worry that regulatory agencies will be captured or corrupted by their ideological 
opponents. Both sides, therefore, seek to control regulatory authority through detailed rules, 
formal legal procedures, judicial review and periodic legislative scrutiny – usually triggered 
by complaints of underenforcement or overenforcement (R.A. Kagan, 2001). For regulatory 
agency	officials,	adhering	to	the	rules	and	demonstrating	a	strong	enforcement	record	provides	
a relatively safe harbor in the ongoing political storms (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; R.A. Kagan, 
2001). This enforcement pattern does not appear as strong in nations with parliamentary 
governments, cohesive political parties, robust national bureaucracies, and strong national 
trade associations. (Scruggs, Chapter 3; Kagan, R.A., 2001).
Enforcement style also tends to vary within individual countries – from one regulatory 
agency	to	another,	across	regional	field	offices	of	the	same	agency,	and	even	among	individual	
inspectors in the same program (Scholz and Wei, Chapter 7; Braithwaite et al., 1987; Feinstein, 
1989; Hutter, 1989; Nielsen, 2006). In Chapter 6, May and Winter helpfully distinguish the 
various styles of regulatory inspectors in terms of both the formalism of their interactions and 
their use of coercion, showing that these two dimensions illuminate the variation in inspection 
styles they observed.
Sociolegal scholars have linked variation in enforcement styles to factors such as statutory 
design, characteristics of regulated entities and the background political environment (Kagan, 
1994). Regulators tend to employ a more cooperative approach when they deal with larger 
enterprises that have professional compliance staffs and a reputational stake in being seen 
as good corporate citizens. They pursue more of a legalistic approach when dealing with 
smaller	firms	that	are	less	visible	to	the	public,	more	financially	hard-pressed	and	hence	more	
tempted to evade the law (Shover et al., 1984). Regulators also face more pressures to adopt 
an aggressive, sanction-oriented enforcement style in the aftermath of a serious accident 
or problem that is attributed to regulatory laxity, or in the wake of a journalistic exposé of 
ineffective enforcement (Kagan, 1994).
In addition, political factors such as the ideology of the government in power, have been 
shown	to	influence	regulatory	enforcement	style.	As	the	costs	imposed	by	the	regulatory	state	
have grown, conservative political parties often promise to reduce regulatory burdens on 
the business sector, while left-of-centre parties typically promise to make regulation more 
stringent and effective. Once elected, political party leaders can affect agencies’ policies and 
enforcement methods by choosing whom to appoint to leadership positions in an agency; by 
expanding	or	contracting	agency	staffing	and	resources;	by	high-publicity	legislative	oversight	
hearings;	and	sometimes	by	quietly	telling	regulatory	officials	how	they	would	like	regulatory	
issues of urgent political concern to be handled (Kagan, 1994, p. 401). In Chapter 7 John T. 
Scholz	and	Feng	Heng	Wei	demonstrate	 that	workplace	safety	officials	 in	American	states	
with	 Democratic	 governors	 and	 Democrat-controlled	 legislatures	 imposed	 more	 frequent	
and	larger	penalties	than	did	officials	in	Republican	states.	Fines	imposed	by	OSHA,	the	US	
federal workplace safety agency, declined in the early 1980s after President Reagan, newly 
elected after denouncing ‘excessive government regulation’, appointed a new agency head 
(see Chapter 7, this volume). Conversely, in 1982 and 1983, aggressive oversight hearings 
by congressional Democrats forced President Reagan’s administration to reverse course: 
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after an initial decline, federal environmental clean-up orders and criminal prosecutions for 
regulatory	offenses	quickly	increased	to	levels	that	exceeded	those	that	prevailed	during	the	
preceding Democratic administration (Wood, 1988; Wood and Waterman, 1991). Sociolegal 
studies in Western Europe have similarly found that enforcement and implementation can be 
affected by political party dominance and political leaders’ concerns (Hutter, 1989; Niemeijer, 
1989). In many democracies, political protest and legal action by citizen groups have become 
almost as important as electoral politics in shaping regulatory agency enforcement activity, 
and sometimes more so (Gunningham et al., 2004).
Responses to Regulation
Governments make and enforce rules in order to change business behaviour and thereby 
achieve improved outcomes in the world (Parker, 2000). Sociolegal scholars, accordingly, 
have sought to assess regulation’s effects on both businesses’ compliance with rules and the 
attainment of the objectives underlying those rules. They have also sought to explain why 
some regulated entities readily comply – and even sometimes go beyond compliance – while 
others resist or comply only reluctantly.
Consistent with the theory of regulatory capture, some scholars have viewed the enactment 
of regulations as little more than ‘symbolic politics’, since politicians typically have been 
more	eager	to	announce	new	regulatory	programs	than	to	fund	them	adequately	(Edelman,	
1964).	The	collapse	of	many	important	fisheries,	for	example,	 is	 testimony	to	the	repeated	
failures	of	regulatory	regimes	ostensibly	designed	to	restrict	the	number	of	fishing	boats	and	
the	size	of	the	catch	(Stone,	1997).	Partly	due	to	political	pressures,	American	officials	charged	
with regulating the savings and loan industry in the 1980s disastrously failed to prevent 
large numbers of too risky loans, leading to the collapse of many lenders (Rubin, 2000); 
unfortunately, a similar regulatory failure occurred in Japan (Millhaupt and Miller, 2000). 
Even when the social problems motivating regulation diminish in scope or severity, we cannot 
always be certain that regulation has caused things to improve, as underlying shifts in the 
economy or advances in technology may well bring about improvements too. For example, 
Michael Greenstone (2004) has carefully analysed the impact of the Clean Air Act of 1970 on 
sulphur	dioxide	emissions	in	the	United	States,	finding	that	regulation	played	at	most	only	a	
minor role in the nearly 80 per cent decline in sulphur dioxide pollution.
Although	many	regulatory	programmes	do	reflect	‘symbolic	politics’	to	a	certain	extent,	
and although many governmental agencies do lack the resources and political backing to 
enforce	 their	 rules	 adequately	 (Gunningham,	1987),	 the	notion	 that	 political	machinations	
usually reduce regulatory legislation to ineffectiveness is far from always the case. Many 
programmes have brought about remarkable changes. To mention just a few examples, 
regulation has markedly improved the safety of banking, dairy products, electrical systems 
in housing, pharmaceuticals and motor vehicles. It has sharply reduced death rates in coal 
mines (Lewis-Beck and Alford, 1980; Braithwaite, 1985). It has compelled manufacturers 
and municipalities to spend billions of dollars on waste-water and hazardous waste treatment, 
diminishing many forms of pollution even in an era of rapid industrial and population growth 
(Easterbrook, 1999; Scruggs, Chapter 3). In the United States, regulation has spurred the 
elimination of cigarette-smoking from thousands of workplaces and restaurants (Kagan and 
Skolnick, 1993). Partly by supplementing public enforcement with private causes of action, 
 
Regulation and Regulatory Processes xxi
regulation has helped increase employment opportunities and earnings for African-Americans 
in the United States (Burstein and Edwards, 1994).
In explaining businesses’ compliance with these and other regulatory regimes, sociolegal 
scholars	have	sought	to	untangle	the	relative	influence	of	deterrence	(that	is,	the	fear	of	legal	
sanctions and related adverse publicity) versus social norms (that is, the felt duty to comply 
with the law or achieve the goals of the regulation) (Thornton et al., 2005). Based on detailed 
records of inspections of, and compliance by, nursing homes in Australia, John Braithwaite and 
Toni Makkai (Chapter 8), indicate that variation in compliance is not explained by standard 
deterrence theory – that is, simply the fear of inspections and sanctions – but rather is best 
explained by the degree to which chief nurses and their staffs have a strong sense of duty 
to comply with regulatory norms. May (2004) found that residential construction company 
officials,	in	describing	their	motives	to	comply	with	building	code	provisions,	ranked	their	
general	duty	to	comply	with	the	law,	as	well	as	their	desire	to	maintain	a	reputation	for	quality,	
as	much	more	 important	 than	 fear	 of	 regulatory	 fines.	 Summarizing	 a	 number	 of	 studies,	
Vandenbergh (2003, p. 127) concludes that notwithstanding ‘the small risks of inspections 
and	the	small	size	of	sanctions,	compliance	rates	[for	environmental	requirements]	are	widely	
regarded to be higher than predicted by the standard deterrence model’ (see also Weil, 1996).
Although	many	firms	have	developed	a	‘culture	of	compliance’	that	does	not	depend	directly	
on the fear of punishment, such an internalized culture is neither universal nor invariant. 
Regulatory violations remain far from rare (Rechtschaffen, 2004). In some industries, a culture 
of compliance arises only when regulatory agencies have established a credible enforcement 
record (Gunningham et al., 2005). For some regulations, compliance is not cheap, and so 
firms	are	reluctant	to	invest	in	compliance	measures	absent	assurance	that	competitors	who	do	
not comply will be caught and punished (Thornton et al.,	2005).	Reflecting	on	his	experience	
as	 head	 of	 the	US	Office	 of	 Price	Administration	 during	 the	 Second	World	War,	 Chester	
Bowles	(1971,	p.	25)	famously	quipped	that	about	20	per	cent	of	regulated	firms	will	readily	
comply with any regulation, 5 per cent will actively resist complying, and the remaining 75 
per cent will go along provided they believe that the recalcitrant 5 per cent will be caught and 
punished.
As	exemplified	by	the	study	of	OSHA	enforcement	described	in	the	essay	by	Wayne	B.	
Gray and John T. Scholz (Chapter 9), sociolegal research has repeatedly revealed that, in some 
regulatory contexts, the experience of being inspected and sanctioned for non-compliance 
does result in increases in compliance and the achievement of regulatory objectives (Helland, 
1998; Mendeloff and Gray, 2004; Gray and Shadbegian, 2005; Shimshack and Ward, 
2005).	Likewise,	 the	 ‘visibility’	of	 regulatory	violations	 to	 regulatory	officials	or	potential	
complainants	–	as	enhanced	by	the	frequency	of	 inspections	or	by	regulations	that	compel	
firms	to	make	data	concerning	their	 regulatory	performance	readily	available	 to	 the	public	
– has been associated with higher levels of compliance.
Business commitment to regulatory compliance, it has been shown, is also affected by 
social pressures, such as the presence of citizen watchdog organizations which have the 
capacity	 to	draw	 the	attention	of	news	media	or	 regulatory	officials	 to	 a	firm’s	 regulatory	
violations.	 Kazumasu	 Aoki	 and	 John	 W.	 Cioffi	 (Chapter	 10)	 find	 that	 a	 multinational	
corporation’s Japanese facility had a stronger record of complying with manufacturing waste 
disposal regulations than did a parallel facility in the United States, even though governmental 
inspections	in	Japan	were	less	frequent	and	legally	threatening.	One	reason,	they	suggest,	is	
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that social pressures for compliance were much greater in Japan, partly as a result of horrible 
episodes of toxic environmental pollution in the 1970s.
In economically advanced democracies, many business managers regard the risk of 
informal social sanctions as far more salient and economically threatening than even the 
risk	of	regulatory	penalties.	These	informal	sanctions	operate	by	adversely	affecting	a	firm’s	
reputation and can be triggered by negative publicity about the company’s products, practices, 
or pollution – and also, of course, by any formal legal penalties or enforcement actions 
taken	against	 the	firm.	Research	shows	 that	many	firms	 today	will	exceed	 their	 regulatory	
obligations simply to provide themselves with a margin of error to protect themselves from 
the repercussions of perceived irresponsible conduct (Mehta and Hawkins, 1998; Prakash, 
2000; Gunningham et al., 2003).
Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton’s (2003) cross-national study of the regulatory behaviour 
of	pulp	and	paper	mills	confirms	 these	 tendencies,	as	 summarized	by	 the	essay	by	Robert	
Kagan, Neil Gunningham and Dorothy Thornton reprinted as Chapter 11 in this volume. The 
authors	find	that	business	managers	speak	of	having	to	comply	with	their	facilities’	‘social	
license’ – as well as their regulatory licence. Indeed, social pressures were the dominant factor 
in explaining why many pulp mills invested in costly ‘beyond compliance’ measures, such as 
those which reduced unpleasant odours that affected their neighbors. Echoing some related 
findings	 in	Aoki	 and	Cioffi	 (Chapter	 10),	Gunningham,	Kagan	 and	Thorton	 also	find	 that	
each	company’s	overall	management	style	was	a	significant	factor	in	explaining	variation	in	
corporate regulatory performance.
The same authors emphasize one further relevant point. Whereas normative pressures to 
comply	and	a	firm’s	management	culture	are	important	in	explaining	variation	in	corporate	
regulatory	compliance	at	any	given	point	 in	 time,	business	firms	 in	market	economies	are	
also	subject	to	fierce	economic	competition.	Their	economic	licence	–	which	demands	cost	
containment and the maintenance of positive earnings – tends to exert downward pressure on 
expenditures for both compliance and ‘beyond compliance’ measures. As a result, governmental 
regulations, backed by a credible threat of enforcement, are still usually necessary to induce 
firms	to	make	very	large	investments	when	it	is	necessary	to	make	significant	improvements	
in the achievement of regulatory goals.
New Directions in Regulatory Design
In	 recent	 decades,	 political	 demands	 for	 greater	 economic	 efficiency,	 intensified	 by	 the	
competitive pressures unleashed by the increasing globalization of trade, have induced 
governments sometimes to ‘privatize’ or ‘deregulate’ government-owned monopolies or 
oligopolies that provide transportation, telecommunications, electric power and water, and 
other services (Feigenbaum et al., 1998). These same pressures, combined with business 
complaints	about	 regulatory	 inflexibility,	have	also	 led	 to	 the	search	 for	alternatives	 to,	or	
modifications	of,	traditional	‘command	and	control’	regulation,	by	which	is	generally	meant	
governmental prescription of the implementation of uniform precautionary measures or control 
technologies	for	all	firms	in	an	industry.	Alternatives	to	traditional	governmental	regulation	
seek	to	make	regulation	more	flexible,	giving	regulated	entities	more	discretion	to	identify	
and ameliorate sources of harm (Richards, 2000).
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At the far end of the spectrum of discretion, self-regulation delegates rule-making and 
enforcement	functions	entirely	to	regulated	firms,	their	trade	associations	or	private	standard	
setting	organizations	 (Cheit,	1990;	Priest,	1997;	Haufler,	2002;	Nash,	2002;	Parker	2002).	
Extensive	 systems	 of	 self-regulation	 can	 be	 found	 in	 sectors	 such	 as	 financial	 securities	
(Jackson, 2001), nuclear power (Rees, 1994), forest products (Meidinger, 2003) and chemical 
manufacturing (Rees, 1997). Professional societies and engineering organizations have 
established countless private codes and standards – such as ‘generally accepted accounting 
practices’, hospital accreditation regimes and standards for appropriate insulation and wiring 
for electrical appliances (Cheit, 1990).
Self-regulatory systems sometimes arise to protect the collective interests of an industrial 
sector in the wake of a major disaster caused by an individual member in the sector – such 
as occurred following the major accidents at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor in 
Pennsylvania or the Union Carbide chemical plant in India (Rees, 1994, 1997; Nash, 2002). 
More generally, businesses have an interest in adopting systems of self-regulation whenever 
doing so can stave off more costly forms of governmental regulation (Lyon and Maxwell, 
2004; Johnston, 2006). When self-regulation succeeds in doing so, it sometimes amounts to 
little more than a sophisticated form of regulatory capture, a symbolic gesture that appears to 
have addressed a social problem but in reality has not (Howard et al., 2000; King and Lenox, 
2000). On the other hand, although self-regulation certainly can provide political cover to an 
industry, research indicates that at least certain kinds of voluntary business effort can result in 
demonstrable social improvements (Potoski and Prakash, 2005). Businesses can be motivated 
to	achieve	even	somewhat	costly	changes	on	their	own	if	they	face	sufficient	market	pressures	
to act in a socially responsible manner (Reinhardt, 2000; Gunningham et al., 2003; Hay et 
al.,	2005;	Vogel,	2005)	or	if	the	threat	of	impending	regulatory	action	is	sufficiently	credible	
(Segerson and Miceli, 1998).
At the same time that self-regulation and privatization have decentralized regulatory 
authority for some markets and risks, businesses and policymakers also have tried to make 
traditional	government	regulation	more	flexible	and	efficient.	Ironically,	the	replacement	of	
government	monopolies	 and	 regulated	 cartels	 with	 competitive	 private	 firms	 has	 actually	
spawned an increased need for governmental controls to address concerns about prices, 
access	 to	 service,	 service	quality	and	 the	 inevitable	externalities	generated	by	competitive	
firms	 (Vogel,	 1996;	 Gómez-Ibáñez,	 2003).	 But,	 even	 so,	 governments	 still	 face	 a	 choice	
between	regulations	that	tightly	constrain	the	behaviour	of	firms,	requiring	them	to	act	in	a	
manner that the regulator deems best for achieving a given regulatory objective (but which 
may	not	be	the	best	or	most	cost-effective	option	for	all	firms),	or	regulations	that	allow	firms	
some degree of leeway in deciding how to achieve the overall objective. Sometimes this 
leeway	comes	about	when	regulatory	enforcement	officials	adopt	a	flexible	enforcement	style.	
Even in regulatory programmes generally viewed as ‘command and control’, for example, 
regulators can ‘delegate the details’ to regulated entities in permitting or licensing proceedings 
by	requiring	them	to	develop,	submit	and	then	follow	pollution	prevention	or	risk	reduction	
plans that they themselves tailor to their own particular enterprise (see, for example, Dwyer et 
al., 2000; Gunningham et al., 2003, pp. 46–47, 51, 77).
More	 visible	 efforts	 to	 enhance	 flexibility	 arise	when	 regulatory	 agencies	 grant	 formal	
exemptions from highly prescriptive regulations to certain regulated facilities, usually those 
that	already	have	a	good	compliance	record	and	demonstrate	some	kind	of	equivalent	or	even	
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superior performance. In the early 1980s, for example, the American EPA initiated a ‘bubble’ 
programme under which a manufacturing plant could modify the restrictions imposed in its 
detailed	source-by-source	air	pollution	permits	as	long	as	it	could	find	ways	of	ensuring	that	
its overall emissions (into an imaginary plant-wide ‘bubble’) did not increase (Levin, 1982; 
Hahn and Hester, 1989). Later, in the 1990s, drawing in part on a pilot study at an Amoco 
refinery	 in	Yorktown,	Virginia,	 the	American	EPA	established	a	 formal	exemption	process	
called	Project	XL	which	provided	for	facility-specific	contracts	negotiated	among	firms,	the	
agency	and	environmental	advocacy	groups	that	granted	the	facility	flexibility	in	return	for	
superior environmental progress and high levels of transparency (Caballero, 1998; Blackman 
and Mazurek, 2001; Marcus et al., 2002).
At the state level, California’s Occupational Safety and Health Agency had earlier established 
a	programme	under	which	enforcement	officials	granted	more	flexibility	to	construction	firms	
which	had	established	collaborative	worker–management	safety	programmes	that	identified	
and reduced accident rates (Rees, 1988). Other countries have adopted similar programmes 
that rely on negotiated contracts with regulated entities. Sweden has had a workplace safety 
regime that provides special training and legal powers to worker safety representatives, 
facilitating	a	non-legalistic,	site-specific	style	of	regulation	(Kelman,	1981).	In	the	Netherlands,	
government regulators have negotiated ‘environmental covenants’ with industry associations, 
committing	all	firms	in	the	association	to	collaborate	in	specifying	and	achieving	regulatory	
goals (Hazard and Orts, 2000).
In	addition	 to	efforts	 to	negotiate	exemptions	or	site-specific	regulatory	covenants,	both	
legislatures	and	regulatory	agencies	have	sought	to	build	flexibility	into	the	binding	rules	that	
governments	 impose	on	firms.	A	principal	way	of	providing	flexibility	has	been	to	 impose	
performance	goals	on	firms	–	instead	of	mandating	specific	means	to	achieve	those	goals.	The	
advantages of these so-called performance standards have been widely noted (Breyer, 1982; 
Viscusi, 1983; Coglianese et al., 2003). By specifying an end state to achieve, performance 
standards	give	regulated	firms	the	ability	to	choose	both	the	most	effective	and	least	costly	
means	of	 reducing	harm.	Performance	standards	also	provide	firms	with	an	opportunity	 to	
innovate, seeking out better or lower-cost strategies to meet the performance target.
Some have suggested that an even better approach is for governments simply to tax 
businesses	for	the	generation	of	harms,	at	levels	that	are	equivalent	to	the	costs	those	harms	
impose on society (Pigou, 1932). These kinds of regulatory tax scheme are intended primarily 
to	change	firm	behaviour,	not	necessarily	 to	 raise	 revenue.	 In	 theory,	 taxes	will	maximize	
regulatory	efficiency	by	ensuring	that	firms	achieve	the	cheapest	and	most	optimal	reduction	
in harms. As attractive as they may be in theory, however, regulatory taxes have been only 
infrequently	adopted	in	practice.	Gjalt	Huppes	and	Robert	A.	Kagan	(Chapter	12),	offer	an	
empirical account of one of the few attempts to use taxes as a regulatory tool. They examine 
two tax schemes adopted in the Netherlands that were designed to reduce pollution. They 
found	 that	a	 tax	on	 the	discharge	of	environmental	harmful	 industrial	effluents,	enacted	 in	
the 1970s and enforced by well-regarded local water authorities, sharply reduced pollution. 
In contrast, they found that a second tax programme, designed to reduce water pollution from 
the	 agricultural	 use	 of	manure,	was	 far	 less	 effective,	 largely	 because	 of	 the	 difficulty	 of	
monitoring compliance in a decentralized industry of many small producers. Huppes and 
Kagan	conclude	that	technical	measurement	and	monitoring	difficulties	and	low	organizational	
capacity constrain the effectiveness of regulatory taxes.
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Like taxes, tradable permit systems are another market-based alternative to conventional 
regulation (see, for example, Dales, 1968; Tietenberg, 1985). With tradable permits, the 
government makes an initial allocation of permits based on an overall level of harm deemed 
acceptable, but then allows businesses to trade these permits with each other. The approach 
is	actually	similar	to	performance	standards,	but	instead	of	requiring	every	firm	or	facility	to	
meet	the	same	level	of	performance,	firms	can	trade	permits	with	each	other	and	thereby	vary	
their	 level	depending	on	 the	specific	control	costs	 they	 face.	Firms	also	have	an	 incentive	
to improve their performance below their permitted levels, so that they can sell the excess 
credits.
The United States successfully adopted a permit trading system in the 1980s to accompany 
a mandated phase-down in the use of lead additives in gasoline (Nussbaum, 1991; Nichols, 
1997;	Newell	and	Rogers,	2004).	Subsequently,	it	adopted	still	more	prominent	permit	trading	
programme in the 1990s to encourage utilities to develop their own plans for cutting sulphur 
dioxide emissions, a major source of acid rain (Stewart, 2001, pp. 103–12). In Chapter 13 
of this volume, Robert N. Stavins summarizes the lessons of the American experience with 
sulphur dioxide emissions trading, a regulatory programme which met targeted emissions 
reductions	at	a	significant	cost	savings	due	to	the	fact	that	firms	with	lower	control	costs	could	
reduce	more	and	sell	 their	excess	permits	 to	firms	with	higher	control	costs.	Like	Huppes	
and Kagan in their study of regulatory taxes, Stavins concluded that the successful adoption 
and implementation of this trading system depended ultimately on institutional and political 
factors, such as the establishment of a market clearinghouse for permits, thereby lowering 
transaction costs associated with trading, and the development of affordable and effective 
monitoring methods.
In	situations	where	monitoring	is	difficult	or	costly,	regulators	have	sometimes	imposed	rules	
requiring	firms	to	identify	risks	posed	by	their	own	operations	and	develop	their	own	set	of	
internal policies and monitoring procedures. For example, food-processing facilities in nearly 
every developed country must now comply with a regulatory approach known as HACCP, 
an acronym which stands for Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (May, 2002). Under 
HACCP regulations, food processors must identify all possible points in the production process 
where food contamination can occur, develop measures for preventing contamination at these 
critical control points, and establish internal procedures for monitoring and documenting 
employee compliance with these measures. Sometimes described as ‘enforced’ or ‘mandated’ 
self-regulation (Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Braithwaite, 1982; Rees, 1988; Hutter, 2001), 
regulations	like	HACCP	aim	directly	at	the	conduct	and	quality	of	a	business’s	management,	
seeking to make it more systematic and preventive. As Cary Coglianese and David Lazer 
show in Chapter 14, such management-based regulation may be most useful both when 
monitoring	is	difficult	and	when	firms	have	sufficiently	heterogeneous	operations	that	there	
exists no uniform means of reducing the targeted harm. Yet precisely because management-
based	regulation	may	be	used	in	situations	where	monitoring	can	be	difficult,	this	regulatory	
approach	 can	 present	 significant	 oversight	 challenges.	When	 governments	 have	 shifted	 to	
HACCP or other management-based approaches, for example, they have often needed to re-
tool	 their	 inspection	personnel	 so	 that	 they	can	go	beyond	filling	out	checklists	and	 try	 to	
assess	the	quality	or	adequacy	of	firms’	planning.	Getting	small	businesses	to	understand	and	
take	management-based	regulation	seriously	can	also	require	governments	to	invest	resources	
in compliance assistance programmes (Fairman and Yapp, 2005).
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As	another	alternative	to	conventional	regulation,	governments	have	sometimes	required	
enterprises simply to report or publicize the risks associated with their products or processes, 
thus	providing	government,	consumers	and	communities	with	information	relevant	to	firms’	
social performance. Information disclosure has long been the major thrust of regulatory systems 
governing	securities	markets	and	other	aspects	of	corporate	finance	(see,	for	example,	Stigler,	
1964; Benston, 1973; Simon, 1989). Such disclosure strategies are also found increasingly 
in a variety of areas of social regulation (Graham, 2002; Jin and Leslie, 2003). For example, 
the	US	Congress	in	1986	established	a	Toxic	Release	Inventory	(TRI)	that	requires	certain	
companies to measure and publicly disclose the levels of toxic chemicals in their air and water 
emissions (Hamilton, 2005). That reporting obligation alone, some researchers have reported, 
stimulated manufacturers to reduce their on-site inventories and releases of hazardous 
materials (Konar and Cohen, 1997; Fung and O’Rourke, 2000) – an outcome consistent with 
the	view	that	business	firms	can	be	concerned	about	compliance	with	their	‘social	licence’	as	
well	as	with	specific	regulatory	requirements	(Kleindorfer	and	Orts,	1998;	Gunningham	et al., 
2003; Vogel, 2005).
Although	much	research	has	been	supportive	of	flexibility-enhancing	regulatory	innovations	
like information disclosure, performance standards, market-based incentives and management-
based regulation, the research literature also points to some of the potential limitations of 
these approaches. As with any approach to law and policy, the newer approaches to regulation 
can be implemented ineffectually, failing to achieve regulatory goals or even creating 
unintended side-effects. Peter J. May’s analysis in Chapter 15 of this volume provides a 
noteworthy example of some of the potential problems that can arise when governments give 
more	discretion	to	regulated	firms.	Examining	the	effects	of	a	performance-based	approach	
to building codes adopted in New Zealand, May found that many builders used the discretion 
they	were	granted	to	experiment	with	cheaper,	less	suitable	building	materials	and	techniques.	
Even	 though	 these	 alternatives	 apparently	 satisfied	 the	 specific	 performance	 standards	 for	
structural	integrity,	they	failed	to	provide	adequate	protection	from	wet	weather	–	an	aspect	of	
overall	performance	not	clearly	addressed	by	the	standards	–	and	consequently	parts	of	many	
new buildings throughout the country experienced problems with mildew and deterioration. 
The implication for newer approaches to regulation seems clear. At the same time that these 
approaches temper the rigidity that can accompany conventional regulatory strategies, they 
present particular needs for effective monitoring and enforcement since they are being used, 
inherently,	 in	 contexts	where	 firms’	 private	 interests	 do	 not	 comport	 completely	with	 the	
overall demands society places on business.
About this Volume
The essays reproduced in the following pages of this volume, all of which have been published 
elsewhere, have been selected not only for their clarity and insight, but also because they 
cover a wide range of topics that have been central to sociolegal research on regulation. 
Many	other	studies	of	equal	merit,	and	even	perhaps	some	of	greater	merit,	have	not	been	
included. We were constrained to include only essays published in academic journals. Hence 
we excluded excellent essays that were published in books, as well as chapters of excellent 
monographs. Furthermore, in the interest of providing as many diverse readings as possible, 
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we were compelled to exclude some excellent but longer essays, including lengthy law journal 
articles.
Even	 with	 the	 broad	 methodological	 and	 substantive	 diversity	 reflected	 in	 the	 essays	
reproduced	in	this	volume,	those	that	we	have	selected	still	do	not	adequately	represent	the	
entire	range	of	social	scientific	approaches	to	the	study	of	regulation,	or	the	entire	range	of	
social control processes that might be considered spheres of ‘regulation’. All branches of law 
–	criminal	law,	contract	law,	tort	law,	traffic	law	and	so	on	–	have	some	regulatory	function,	
for	they	are	designed	to	deter	behaviours	that	have	been	politically	defined	as	harmful	or	anti-
social, and thereby to encourage socially responsible behaviour. But in conventional legal 
discourse, which we used in our selection criteria for this volume, the term ‘regulation’ has been 
reserved for bodies of law that are elaborated through the promulgation of specialized rules, 
enforced	by	government	agencies	and	aimed	at	the	behaviour	of	business	firms,	other	large	
organizations, and professional service providers. Whereas criminal and civil law typically 
are enforced via prosecutions and lawsuits against alleged violators, brought after a harmful 
act or omission has occurred, regulation is primarily prophylactic in purpose, designed to 
prevent harmful actions before they occur. Furthermore, unlike civil law enforcement, where 
the initial costs are borne by injured parties who must gather evidence and hire lawyers, in 
regulatory programmes (as in the enforcement of criminal law by police departments) the 
government shoulders the cost of investigation and prosecution of complaints.
Programmes of governmental regulation are often superimposed on pre-existing forms of 
private	ordering.	The	first	line	of	defence	against	dangerous	products	and	unfair	practices	is	
generally the incentive system created by the marketplace. The threat of developing a bad 
reputation	and	losing	business	motivates	many	enterprises	to	establish	quality	control	systems	
of various kinds. Contract and tort law provide a second line of defence. By enabling victims 
of broken promises or negligent behaviour to threaten enterprises with legal penalties, they 
create incentives for responsible behaviour, inducing many companies and trade organizations 
to create systems of self-regulation (Rees, 1994; Gunningham and Rees, 1997). The essays 
reprinted in this volume, however, focus on legally binding programmes, authorized by 
statutory laws and enforced primarily by governmental agencies.
Even within the sphere of governmental laws and regulatory programmes, the essays 
in	this	volume	–	nor	those	that	could	be	fitted	into	any	single	compendium	–	are	not	fully	
representative of all the important research on regulation. We have tended to select empirical 
essays	 rather	 than	primarily	 theoretical	works,	 thus	excluding	some	classic	and	significant	
essays by economists (for example, Coase, 1960; Becker, 1976). The essays in this volume are 
also primarily about social or protective regulation, rather than economic regulation aimed at 
controlling prices, market entry, or competition.
There are still further limitations. This collection emphasizes essays of relatively 
contemporary regulatory processes, thus excluding much valuable research by historians of 
regulation (for example, McGraw, 1984; Andrews, 1999; Morag-Levine, 2003). The essays 
also generally focus tightly on one particular regulatory programme – in one country, or at 
most two or three countries – thus excluding major books and essays that examine the factors 
that have driven and shaped the spread of regulation across many countries (for example, 
Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). Furthermore, because the general thrust of sociolegal research 
has been on domestic regulation in economically advanced democracies, this volume pays 
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little attention to the international regulatory regimes nor to national regulatory processes in 
developing countries.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this volume does still contain a highly diverse and 
illustrative collection of the last generation’s worth of leading research on regulation and 
regulatory processes. Taken together, the work reprinted in this collection maps out the key 
lines	of	 inquiry	 in	sociolegal	studies	of	regulation,	shows	the	contours	of	 the	answers	 that	
have	emerged	to	date	and	raises	new	and	yet	unanswered	questions.	It	is	our	hope	that	the	
reader of this collection will conclude, as we do, that the sociolegal study of regulation holds 
both exciting intellectual challenges and enormous implications for social justice and welfare. 
In bringing together this varied work in a single collection, we seek to stimulate, entice, 
and prepare still others to join in the next generation’s worth of study on one of the most 
significant	legal	developments	in	our	global	society.
Cary Coglianese and Robert A. Kagan
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